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1 INTRODUCTION  
An aircraft fuel system is a complex system, con-
sisting of a large number of different components that 
can fail, sometimes in more than one failure mode.  In 
addition, the failure modes will have an effect on the 
performance of the system, at different degrees of se-
verity.  In order to be able to monitor system perfor-
mance and detect early signs of failure, sensors are 
used on the system, such as flow, pressure and level 
sensors on the fuel system.  In addition, if a compo-
nent failure can be diagnosed, appropriate actions can 
be taken in flight, such as abort or adapt the mission, 
and maintenance work can be carried out on the 
ground on the part of the system with the failure. 
However, sensors themselves have associated 
costs, such as purchase, installation and the mainte-
nance cost, and their weight needs to be considered.  
Therefore, a correct balance between the number of 
sensors, their positioning on the system and the infor-
mation provided about the faults needs to be 
achieved. 
In order to be able to propose a sensor selection 
method, a sensor performance metric is defined in this 
paper.  This metric considers the features of each in-
dividual sensor and their groups, such as the number 
of faults that can be detected and the number of com-
ponent failures that can be diagnosed.  The compo-
nent failures in the system can be diagnosed using a 
Bayesian Belief Network (BBN).  The evidence from 
sensor readings can be introduced to the network, up-
dating the probability of the system components be-
ing in the failed state, therefore, indicating the com-
ponents that are most likely to have failed. 
In this paper, a brief overview of the previous re-
search is given in section 2, followed by outlining an 
example system in section 3.  Section 4 introduces the 
sensor performance metric and the methodology for 
fault diagnostics.  Section 5 shows the application of 
the method to the example system and section 6 anal-
yses the application of the methodology.  Finally, sec-
tion 7 summarises the work presented in this paper 
and suggests future work. 
2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
In this section, some published work on sensor se-
lection strategies is discussed, which is followed by 
work on system modelling and fault diagnostics. 
2.1 Sensor selection 
A range of approaches for determining which sen-
sor combination is best have been developed.  For ex-
ample, Maul et al. (2008) developed a performance 
metric for aircraft systems.  The authors demonstrated 
their work with an example system, which was a sub-
system of a space shuttle main engine.  This method 
requires human input for model parameters and as a 
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result, the selection process is subjective.  Pourali & 
Mosleh (2012) developed a utility function, but this 
work does not consider the ability to diagnose fail-
ures.  Lambert & Farrington (2007) used a cost-bene-
fit function, outlining the best locations for sensors to 
detect chemical, biological and radiological air con-
taminants.  However, this function uses multiple case 
specific factors such as the density of elderly people, 
making it difficult to apply the method to other types 
of systems. 
A number of authors, such as Santi et al. (2005), 
Spanache et al. (2004), and Maul et al. (2008), used 
genetic algorithms to optimise the sensor selection 
process for various systems, such as aircraft/space-
crafts and a benchmark actuator. 
2.2 System modelling and fault diagnostics 
One of the most commonly used model-based fault 
diagnostics technique is fault tree analysis, also used 
for system reliability assessment.  Hurdle et al. (2008) 
modelled a simple water tank system, using non-co-
herent fault trees, which consider NOT logic in order 
to more accurately model the system.  In Hurdle et al. 
(2007), the technique has been extended to model an 
aircraft fuel system.  The authors consider multiple 
system operation phases, known as a phased mission, 
and they introduce a sensor effectiveness index that 
considers which failures are diagnosed by the sensors.  
In Equation 1, the effectiveness index, IE, is given, 
where N is the number of sensor patterns observed, ni  
is the number of failures identified, nci is the number 
of patterns observed that gives the correct causes, and 
















However, an individual fault tree is required to be 
developed for each possible set of symptoms. 
Bartlett et al. (2006) use an alternative method of 
digraphs, to diagnose failures in the aircraft fuel sys-
tem.  The authors compare the two approaches and 
they state that the fault tree method determines the 
combinations of component failures that can cause 
different sensor readings, whereas the digraph 
method enables the propagation of the failure through 
the system.  Digraphs are also limited by the require-
ment to classify the strength of the relationship be-
tween events in the network.  This introduces subjec-
tivity into the modelling.  The authors suggest that the 
two techniques complement each other, so they 
should be used together. 
Another alternative fault diagnostics method, Petri 
Nets, was proposed by Lloyd et al. (2014), where 
faults on an aircraft fuel rig can be confirmed as true 
or cancelled as false, and the method can be applied 
to reducing the number of false fault alarms on air-
craft fuel systems. 
The fault diagnostics technique used in this paper 
is the BBN.  BBNs are directed acyclic graphs and the 
state of each node is determined using conditional 
probability tables (CPTs).  The BBNs can be built us-
ing fault trees, as suggested by Lampis & Andrews 
(2013).  Evidence about a fault can be introduced in 
the BBN directly, and the probability of each compo-
nent failure mode occurrence is calculated, which 
ranks the causes of that fault.  This feature was the 
main reason for selecting the BBN as the fault diag-
nostic method used in this paper, for demonstrating 
the effectiveness of the selected sensors. 
 
3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
In this section, an example system is introduced, 
which is used to demonstrate the proposed methodol-
ogy. 
The system in Figure 1 consists of 5 valves (V1, 
V2, V3, V4 and V5), and 2 pumps (P1 and P2).  The 
flow is from left to right, where it exits the system via 
a drain.  Sensors S1 – S10 are positioned either side 
of each of the valves and sensor S11 is positioned be-
fore the drain.  Ns is the number of possible sensors, 
Ns = 11 for this example system. 
Under normal operating conditions, each of the 
pumps, P1 and P2, supply a quantity of fuel to the 
system, which passes through valve V1 and V2 re-
spectively.  Then the fuel from the two parallel lines 
passes through valve V3, before going through the 
next two parallel lines with valves V4 and V5 at the 
same rate.  Finally, the fuel leaves the system through 
the drain.  It is assumed that the flow rate through the 
parallel lines is half of the flow rate through the cen-
tral part of the system.  
Each component can be in one of two states: work-
ing or failed.  The pumps are working when they are 
supplying fuel to the system, and the valves are work-
ing when they are allowing fuel to pass through the 
system.  No partial failures are considered in this pa-
per, such as partial supply of fuel or partially blocked 
valves. 
No more than two component failures occurring at 
the same time are considered, for example, P1 fails 
and the rest of the components work, or P1 and V1 
Figure 1 Example system 
fails and the rest of the components work.  Combina-
tions of 3 or more failures are not considered due to a 
very low probability of such event occurrence.  In the 
proposed methodology, 1 or 2 component failures are 
defined as considered failures.  Note that there is no 
time delay between the occurrences of two failures. 
A component failure can be critical to the perfor-
mance of the system, even cause system failure.  For 
this example system, system failure is defined as a 
failure that results in a reduction of the fuel exiting 
through the drain.  This will occur when at least one 
of the pumps cannot supply fuel to the drain by a 
pump being off, or at least one valve is blocked, de-
pending on its location.  The minimal cut sets for this 
system failure logic are: {P1}, {P2}, {V1}, {V2}, 
{V3} and {V4, V5}.  Note that if valve V4 or valve 
V5 (but not both) is blocked, there is no reduction in 
the supply of fuel from the pumps, all the fuel can 
pass through the other parallel line to the one with the 
failed valve and system failure does not occur. 
In the next section, the methodologies for sensor 
selection, system modelling and fault diagnostics are 
introduced. 
4 PROPOSED METHODOLOGY FOR SENSOR 
SELECTION AND FAULT DIAGNOSTICS 
There are three parts of the proposed methodol-
ogy: the sensor selection, the system modelling and 
the fault diagnostics.  Firstly, the sensors to be used 
in the system are selected.  The system can then be 
modelled with these sensors included in the system.  
The model obtained can then be used to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of fault diagnostics using the se-
lected sensors. 
4.1 Performance metric methodology for sensor 
selection 
In order to select the sensors, a sensor performance 
metric is proposed in this paper, which considers the 
occurrence probability of the failures that can be de-
tected, the ease of diagnostics of the failures, and the 
effect that the diagnosed failures have on system fail-
ure.  Note that the fault detection process is about be-
ing able to distinguish between the normal system be-
haviour (without failures) and abnormal system 
behaviour (with failures), whereas the fault diagnos-
tics process localises the cause of the faults. 
The performance metric is defined to be between 
0 and 1, where 1 is the best performance value for the 
sensors.  Note, in the equations for the performance 
metric discussed in the following sections, sensor s 
refers to a single sensor or a group of sensors. 
4.1.1 Detection Term 
In order for a sensor to detect a failure, the sensor 
reading must deviate from the sensor reading, ex-
pected for the normal system behaviour.  Note, for a 
group of sensors, at least one of the sensors needs to 
have a deviated sensor reading for a failure to be de-
tected. 
The detection term, DE{s}, is equal to the ratio be-
tween the probability of occurrence of the detected 
failures and the considered failures in the system.  
This term is given in Equation 2, where Pd is the sum 
of probabilities of considered failures occurrence that 
sensor s can detect, and Pmd is the sum of probabilities 
of considered failures occurrence that can be detected 
by at least one sensor out of all possible sensors.  
Note, there can be hidden failures that none of the 
sensors can detect.  Also, DE{s} is equal to 1 when 
sensor s can detect all the considered failures that can 
be detected, and is equal to 0 when no failures can be 
detected by sensor s. 
 
DE{s} =  
Pd
Pmd
  (2) 
 
4.1.2 Diagnostic Term 
The diagnostic term considers the ease of diagnos-
ing which failure has occurred.  For this term to be its 
maximum value, 1, the sensor would produce a 
unique sensor reading for each combination of com-
ponent failures.  Note, that the combination of com-
ponent failures can also be a single component fail-
ure.  However, in reality, multiple component failure 
combinations can result in the same sensor reading, 
therefore, the diagnostic term is usually lower than 1.  
The term is close to 0 when there are many different 
component failure combinations that have similar 
probabilities and produce the same sensor reading. 
The diagnostic term, DI{s}, consists of terms for 
each of the produced deviated sensor reading combi-
nations, as shown in Equation 3.  Psri is the probability 
that a deviated reading i of sensor s occurs.  For each 
combination of sensor readings, multiple different 
combinations of component failures can be the cause.  
For each of these sensor readings, there will be a com-
bination of component failures that will be the most 
likely to be the cause of the deviated sensor reading 
being recorded.  Pmli is the probability of the most 
likely combination of component failures that can 
cause the reading i of sensor s.  These terms are 
summed over the number of different deviated read-
ings of sensor s, nrs. 
Therefore, DI{s} is the probability that the diag-
nosed failure using sensor s is the actual failure on the 
system. 
 








4.1.3 Criticality Term 
Finally, the criticality term considers the effects on 
the system by the component failures that can be de-
tected by the sensors on the system. 
The criticality term of the performance metric is 
based on the Fussell-Vesely importance measure, 
Cheok et al. (1998).  This importance measure is se-
lected over other importance measures because it can 
be translated to sensors with ease, adapting the defi-
nition of individual components as it was originally 
proposed for.  Other importance measures, such as 
Birnbaum’s importance measure were also consid-
ered but the definition could not be adapted as easily, 
especially for combinations of sensors. 
The Fussell-Vesely importance measure indicates 
the components contribution to system unavailability.  
It is calculated by subtracting the probability that sys-
tem failure occurs when component j is working from 
the probability of system failure and normalised by 
the probability of system failure. 
For this definition to be applied to sensors, the sub-
tracted term is modified to be the probability of sys-
tem failure, given that the non-deviated reading of 
sensor s occurs. 
The criticality term, CR{s}, is given in Equation 4.  
In this equation, Qsys is the system failure probability, 
in other words the probability that the system fails 
with no knowledge of any of the component states, 
and Qsys(qs = 0) is the probability of system failure 















When the sensor does not detect any of the critical 
component failures, CR{s} = 0, but if all critical fail-
ures can be detected by the sensor, then CR{s} = 1.  In 
the next section, a discussion about combining the 
terms to form the sensor performance metric is given. 
4.1.4 Discussion 
The performance metric can be calculated using 
the three terms.  If each term is deemed to be equally 
important, then an average value can be used to get 
the performance metric. 
However, if one of the terms is significantly higher 
than the other terms, this can make the performance 
metric unrepresentative of how useful the sensors are.  
For example, if a sensor only detects one component 
failure, then the diagnostic term will be 1, regardless 
of the failure probability of this single component, 
which can be very low and insignificant.  This in-
creases the value of the performance metric to a much 
higher value than would be expected for a sensor that 
detects a very low percentage of component failures. 
Similar effects could occur if the probability of a 
critical failure is relatively low, in comparison to the 
probability of a failure occurring.  This would result 
in a significantly higher criticality term if the critical 
failures are detected, regardless of the probability of 
the combinations of component failures occurring.  
This would also result in a higher performance metric. 
In most cases, it will be important to get a balance 
between all three terms, but in some cases, it might be 
preferential to favour one of the terms.  Therefore, a 
potential solution could be to use the performance 
metric as the average of the three terms in order to 
reduce the number of sensor combinations that can be 
analysed, but to then consider the individual terms 
separately for the final sensor selection.  This enables 
the best sensor combination for each individual situ-
ation to be selected.  For example, it could be imper-
ative for the criticality term to be as high as possible, 
as long as the other two terms are not below a certain 
threshold.  Such conditions can be satisfied, hence 
giving the analyst the flexibility to choose the best 
sensor combination for their particular application.  


























In the next section, the methodology for system 
modelling is introduced. 
4.2 Fault Diagnostics model 
A BBN is developed for the example system in or-
der to demonstrate how the chosen sensors can be 
used in fault diagnostics.  The BBN was constructed 
using the software, “HUGIN Researcher”. 
A node with a number of states can be used to rep-
resent a sensor, where each state of the node repre-
sents a sensor reading.  However, the number of en-
tries in the CPT for a node is equal to the product of 
the number of states for each of the parent nodes and 
the number of states in the node.  Therefore, the more 
states the nodes have, the larger the CPTs are.  How-
ever, as the nodes have more states, they consider 
more states of the component, and therefore fewer 
nodes are required to represent all the required infor-
mation.  A balance between the number of nodes and 
the size of the CPTs needs to be achieved.  When 
building a BBN, the first step in the methodology is 
to create a node for each of the systems components, 
which will have two states: one state for working state 
and one state for failed state.  The next step is to in-
troduce intermediate nodes if required.  These com-
bine groups of components to determine the values of 
parameters, such as the flow at certain points of the 
system.  For a complex system, there might be a num-
ber of intermediate steps applied.  Finally, nodes for 
the sensors are included.  These determine the sensor 
readings for different system states. 
Once the BBN is built in order to diagnose com-
ponent failures in the system, sensor readings are in-
troduced in the BBN as evidence.  The probability of 
the components being in each of their states is then 
calculated.  If the failure identified by the BBN is not 
the actual failed component, then further evidence 
can be introduced until the correct component failure 
is identified. 
The results of the fault diagnostic process can be 
used for prioritising maintenance or for reconfiguring 
the system operation due to the identified failures. 
In the next section, the methodology is applied to 
the simple system introduced in section 3. 
5 APPLICATION OF THE METHODOLOGY 
For illustration, it is assumed that the probability 
of each component failure is 0.05, such as P(A) = 
0.05.  Therefore, the probability that one component 
is failed is represented as P(A) (1 – P(A))6, and the 
probability that two components are failed is repre-
sented by P(A)2(1 – P(A))5. 
5.1 Sensor Selection 
The best possible performance metric was calcu-
lated by using all eleven sensors on the system, which 
was equal to 0.8961: with a detection term of 1, a di-
agnostics term of 0.6883 and a criticality term of 1.  
This means that all considered combinations of com-
ponent failures can be detected (as DE{s} = 1) and 
therefore all critical failures can be detected (CR{s} = 
1).  However, it does suggest that not all component 
failures can be diagnosed correctly as the value of 
DI{s} is less than 1. 
5.1.1 Results 
Only combinations of four or less sensors are con-
sidered further, as the best possible performance met-
ric (0.8961) was achieved by combinations of four 
sensors.  These combinations of sensors are: 
 S1 S2 S3 S7 
 S1 S2 S3 S9 
 S1 S3 S4 S7 
 S1 S3 S4 S9 
In Table 1, individual sensor rankings are given, 
and in Table 2, the highest 6 rankings of combinations 
of 2 and 3 sensors are given.  Only one combination 
for each ranking in Table 2 is included for brevity.  
There are multiple combinations of sensors with the 
same ranking due to the symmetry between the paral-
lel lines in the system. 
 
Table 1 Ranking of individual sensors for the system 
Rank Sensor I{s} DE{s} DI{s} CR{s} 
1 S7 0.8062 0.9740 0.5067 0.9512 
S8 0.8062 0.9740 0.5067 0.9512 
S9 0.8062 0.9740 0.5067 0.9512 
S10 0.8062 0.9740 0.5067 0.9512 
2 S5 0.6688 0.7532 0.3362 1.0000 
S6 0.6688 0.7532 0.3362 1.0000 
3 S11 0.6667 0.7532 0.3276 1.0000 
4 
 
S1 0.3901 0.4740 0.2740 0.5665 
S2 0.3901 0.4740 0.2740 0.5665 
S3 0.3901 0.4740 0.2740 0.5665 
S4 0.3901 0.4740 0.2740 0.5665 
 
Table 2 Ranking of combinations of 2 and 3 sensors for the system 
Rank Sensors I{s} DE{s} DI{s} CR{s} 
1 S1 S7 0.8684 0.9870 0.6513 0.9754 
2 S2 S7 0.8663 0.9870 0.6447 0.9754 
3 S5 S7 0.8398 1.0000 0.5195 1.0000 
4 S5 S8 0.8377 1.0000 0.5130 1.0000 
5 S8 S10 0.8355 1.0000 0.5065 1.0000 
6 S7 S8 0.8084 0.9740 0.5133 0.9512 
1 S1 S3 S7 0.8939 1.0000 0.6818 1.0000 
2 S1 S3 S8 0.8918 1.0000 0.6753 1.0000 
3 S1 S4 S7 0.8896 1.0000 0.6688 1.0000 
4 S1 S4 S8 0.8874 1.0000 0.6623 1.0000 
5 S1 S8 S10 0.8853 1.0000 0.6558 1.0000 
6 S2 S4 S8 0.8831 1.0000 0.6494 1.0000 
 
Further combinations of 4 sensors are not consid-
ered in this paper due to the small increase in perfor-
mance metric in comparison to the best combination 
of 3 sensors and because of the number of combina-
tions of sensors (double the number of combinations 
of 3 sensors). 
5.1.2 Discussion 
Studying each of the terms in Table 1 shows the 
effectiveness of the idea to consider the three terms 
individually for the final sensor selection.  For exam-
ple, despite the fact that sensors from S7 to S10 are 
ranked higher than sensors S5 and S6, they have a 
lower criticality term.  Therefore, if it is imperative to 
be able to detect all the critical failures, then sensor 
S5 or S6 should be selected. 
The same conclusions can be drawn for the detec-
tion term for the combinations of 2 sensor ranking in 
Table 2.  The sensor combination ranked 3rd (S5 S7) 
detects all the considered failures, which is not possi-
ble with the sensor combinations ranked higher than 
this, such as (S1 S7).  This means that this combina-
tion can be selected, if the analyst requires all failures 
in the system to be detected, regardless of the diag-
nostic term. 
Considering a combination of 2 sensors (instead of 
1 sensor) on the same section of the system only pro-
vides a small increase in the performance metric.  For 
example, the performance metric for sensor S7 is 
0.8062 and the performance metric for sensors both 
S7 and S8 is 0.8084.  The only term that increases 
when using 2 sensors (instead of 1 sensor) is the di-
agnostic term.  This suggests that is best to not pick 
sensors that are in close proximity to each other if 
more failures are to be detected, and only a limited 
number of sensors are available.  It would be better to 
select sensors on different parts of the system. 
The maximum performance metric increases for 
each additional sensor considered, however, there are 
diminishing returns for increasing the number of sen-
sors, which is in line with the motivation of finding a 
balance between information and sensor cost. 
As an illustration, the combination of sensors used 
for diagnosing failures in the system is sensors S1, S3 
and S7.  This is the best combination of three sensors 
in Table 2, which will be used in the next example. 
The position of these selected sensors is such that 
there is one sensor next to each of the pumps and then 
one sensor in the final section of the system.  If a sen-
sor is next to each pump, then the supply of fuel to the 
system will be known.  The sensor in the final section 
then indicates the flow in this last part of the system, 
therefore, the flow through all of the valves can be 
determined using these three sensors. 
5.2 Construction of the fault diagnostics model 
5.2.1 BBN development 
The first step is to create a node for each of the 
components, where each components node has a CPT 
with two states, a working state and a failed state.  The 
values in the CPTs correspond to the probability that 
each component is working (0.95) or failed (0.05). 
The next step is to create a series of nodes that con-
sider the flow at various points in the system known 
as intermediate nodes.  This is done by splitting the 
system into three sections: section 1 consists of the 
two pumps and valves V1 and V2, section 2 consists 
of valve V3, and section 3 consists of valve V4 and 
V5.  The states of these nodes represent the supply of 
fuel from each of these sections to the downstream 
sections of the system. 
Finally, the intermediate nodes, and where re-
quired, the component nodes, are connected to sensor 
nodes.  Including the intermediate nodes reduced the 
size of the CPTs for the sensor nodes, in comparison 
to the CPTs without the intermediate nodes included 
in the BBN.  For example, for sensors S5 – S11, the 
only information about the fuel supply required is the 
quantity supplied, but not which pump is supplying 
the fuel.  Therefore, the CPTs for each of these sen-
sors can be reduced to ¾ of the size by the introduc-
tion of an intermediate node.  The example CPT for 
sensor S11 is given in Table 3.  In this table, FS stands 
for full supply (supply from both pumps), PS stands 
for partial supply (supply from one pump) and NS 
stands for no supply.  This table demonstrates the re-
duction in size of the CPT.  Figure 2 is the BBN for 
the example system.   
5.2.2 Discussion 
The BBNs sensor nodes represent the sensors in 
the system.  They produce sensor readings that corre-
spond to the sensor readings that would be produced 
in a real system, assigning a state for each possible 
sensor reading.  If there are too many different sensor 
readings that can be produced by each sensor, sensor 
readings may have to be grouped together into de-
fined ranges.  However, this would reduce the accu-
racy of the modelling. 
Including intermediate nodes reduced the overall 
size of the network as expected.  However, it high-
lighted the fact that even for a simple system, the size 
of the network was relatively large. 
The BBN is used to aid in the diagnosis of failures 
in the system, as shown in the following section. 
5.3 Fault diagnostics 
Example component failures are diagnosed using 
the BBN in this section.  As previously stated, the sen-
sor combination used for fault diagnosis is one of the 
Section 3 Both Open 4 open 5 blocked 5 open 4 blocked both blocked 
Valve 3 Open Blocked Open Blocked Open Blocked Open Blocked 
Supply FS PS NS FS PS NS FS PS NS FS PS NS FS PS NS FS PS NS FS PS NS FS PS NS 
No flow 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Half flow 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Normal flow 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Figure 2 BBN of example system 
Table 3 CPT for sensor S11 
combinations of three sensors with the highest perfor-
mance metric, sensors S1, S3 and S7.  All combina-
tions of 1 and 2 component failures were considered 
and the failed components were attempted to be diag-
nosed using the fault diagnostic process. 
All the failures in the system can be diagnosed 
with relative ease.  In some cases, they are not diag-
nosed correctly on the first attempt but no more than 
2 components have to be inspected when only one 
component has failed, and no more than 3 compo-
nents have to be inspected when 2 components have 
failed for the correct combination of component fail-
ures to be found.  This demonstrates that the model 
can diagnose the failures and the selected sensors are 
suitable. 
The first case when failures aren’t diagnosed cor-
rectly on the first attempt is when two different com-
ponent failures produce the same symptoms.  For ex-
ample, pump P1 failed (or valve V1 failed) produce 
the same combination of sensor readings.  In this ex-
ample system, each component is equally likely to 
have caused the sensor readings, as all of the compo-
nents have the same reliability.  Therefore, it is not 
possible to definitely diagnose the correct component 
failure (pump P1 or valve V1) on the first inspection, 
the probability of diagnosing correctly the first time 
is 50%.  However, if it is not diagnosed correctly on 
the first attempt, it can be diagnosed correctly when 
the second component is inspected. 
The next case to be investigated is when the same 
sensor reading is produced for a single component 
failure and a combination of component failures, in-
cluding the same single component failure.  An ex-
ample of this is when the fault diagnostic process di-
agnoses the failure to be valve V3 failed.  However, 
there is also the possibility that one of valve V4 or 
valve V5 is also failed, in addition to valve V3.  These 
cases are significantly less likely than just valve V3 
failed, but valve V4 (or V5) would be diagnosed as 
failed when valve V3 is repaired/replaced. 
A similar situation arises if pump P1 or valve V1, 
or pump P2 or valve V2 are failed, in addition to valve 
V3.  When valve V3 is repaired/replaced, this would 
then result in the same situation as described in para-
graph 3 of this sub-section of the paper. 
The final example is when the component failure 
is predicted to be valve V3 failed.  If valves V1 and 
V2 are both failed, it produces the same sensor read-
ings as if valve V3 is failed.  However, the probability 
of this event occurring is significantly less than the 
probability of valve V3 failing.  Therefore, the model 
will not diagnose the component failure (valve V1 
and valve V2) correctly initially, but when further ev-
idence is applied, i.e. valve V3 not failed, the correct 
component failures will be diagnosed.  The example 
cases discussed above results in the diagnostic term 
(DI{s}) being less than 1, (0.6818). 
The cases that were not diagnosed correctly ini-
tially are because these combinations of component 
failures produce the same symptoms as other single 
component failures that are more likely to occur. 
In the next section, an analysis of the methodology 
is given, along with potential improvements. 
6 ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED 
METHODOLOGY 
The first step of the methodology is to calculate the 
performance metric of the sensors.  It has been ob-
served that the BBN model has the potential to be 
used as the framework for calculating sensor perfor-
mance metric automatically. 
When component state evidence is introduced to 
the network, the sensor readings and the probability 
of the event can be produced automatically.  If this is 
completed for all considered component failure com-
binations, the performance metric can be calculated 
automatically.  This removes the need to manually 
calculate the performance metric. 
6.1 Sensor selection 
In section 4.1.4, it was suggested that Equation 4 
should be used as a guide for the initial sensor selec-
tion, and then the individual terms of the performance 
metric should be used for the final selection of the 
sensors.  This enables the analyst to favour specific 
terms of the performance metric, if desired.  Consid-
ering the three terms individually also helps to pre-
vent the accidental selection of a sensor combination 
with one term significantly lower than desirable. 
6.2 Modelling the system 
The BBN model is a good representation of the ex-
ample system.  The BBNs sensor nodes output the 
sensor readings that represent a real system.  How-
ever, the system modelled is simplified, such as not 
considering partial failures, not considering block-
ages in the lines and not considering leaks in the sys-
tem.  If these assumptions were to be removed, then 
the system representation would be more accurate.  
However, including these additional features in the 
BBN model would increase the size of the network 
significantly.  If a significantly larger system is to be 
modelled accurately, this would result in very large 
BBNs.  This could result in the networks being too 
large and it suggests that BBNs may not be scalable.  
Alternative modelling techniques will need to be con-
sidered.  
6.3 Fault diagnostics 
In section 5, it was shown that the methodology 
successfully diagnosed all the component failures.  
There were some cases that the component failures 
were not diagnosed correctly initially, but when fur-
ther evidence was introduced, these component fail-
ures were correctly diagnosed.  Examples of these 
cases were given in section 5.3. 
A particular benefit of the BBN methodology used 
is that the results are the probabilities of each compo-
nent failure.  Therefore, if two most likely failures 
have a similar probability, both failures can be inves-
tigated, for example, maintenance team could be in-
formed of the most likely failures.  This would reduce 
the overall downtime of the system, as both failures 
can be investigated at the same time, and repaired/re-
placed as necessary. 
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In summary, a methodology to select the best com-
bination of sensors using a newly developed perfor-
mance metric was presented.  The sensors were se-
lected based on their ability to detect faults and 
diagnose failures, also considering the criticality of 
the failures detected.  It was suggested that the three 
terms should be considered individually for the final 
selection of sensors.  This would enable the user to 
select the best sensors based on the three different cri-
teria.   
A BBN based methodology was introduced to 
model the system and then diagnose component fail-
ures using the selected sensors.  Evidence was intro-
duced in the BBN and the component failures diag-
nosed.  The outputs of the BBN can be used to rank 
the causes of sensor readings, which represent the 
faults on the system.  The ranks can be used in mainte-
nance prioritisation or mission reconfiguration in 
flight. 
A few future research avenues could be explored.  
Firstly, the methodology needs to be tested on larger 
systems to check its applicability and the model scala-
bility.  This will require the performance metric cal-
culation and sensor selection process to be automated 
in order for it to be completed within a reasonable 
time frame.  Also, multiple system operation phases 
could be considered, such as phased missions which 
are observed on aircraft systems.  These missions can 
consist of a number of individual phases such as take-
off, cruise, fuel transfer and landing.  This also ena-
bles more component failure modes to be considered. 
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